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LETTER
TO THE
AUTHOR
OF A
PAMPHLET,

INTITLED,
A LETTER to a FRIEND in the
Country, on the present POSTURE of AFFAIRS
in EUROPE, and on the CONDUCT of our
MINISTRY at Home, &c.

Europe
12

To which is added,

A POSTSCRIPT relating to the CASE of the late
Marquis of TULLIBARDINE, as Stated in the *London*
Evening-Post of the 10th of *October* last.

WITH

Mr. FORMAN's Letter to a Friend in *Paris*, and some
necessary REMARKS on it.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ROBERTS, in *Warwick-Lane*.
M.DCC.XXXIV.

(Price One Shilling.)

LETTER TO THE AUTHOR OF A PAMPHLET


A LETTER to a FRIEND in the
Country on the present POSTURE of AFFAIRS
in EUROPE. THE CONDUCT of our
MINISTER



A POSTSCRIPT relating to the CASE of the late
Marquis of TUESMARTINE, as stated in the London
Evening-Post of the 10th of October last.

WITH
MR. FORMAN'S Letter to a Friend in Town, and some
GENERAL REMARKS on it.

LONDON:
Printed for J. ROBERTS, in Warwick-Lane.
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SIR,

I BELIEVE I need not make you any Apology for the following Remarks, or rather Additions to your Letter. If you published that Piece for the Service of your Country, I have an equal Right to publish mine with the same View: But which of the two is most likely to answer the End proposed by us, must be left to the Judgment of our Readers.

IN Page 6. you say, “ *France* seems, by her Conduct, to have “ had a longing Eye on the Emperor’s Dominions in *Italy* these many “ Years.” But, Sir, when you were making use of this Stile, I presume you neither considered, that to accuse People unjustly, is to plead in their Favour, with the judicious and impartial Part of Mankind, nor perceived the Sarcasm you darted at our Ministers by so round an Assertion: For, if *France* has really had a longing Eye on the Emperor’s Dominions in *Italy* these many Years, how can *Britain* be said to have had any Eyes at all in not perceiving it as well as you have done? Or how can our Ministers excuse their own Inactivity, while those of *France* have been so alert in driving on, *Jebu-like*, towards the Accomplishment of their Designs? Certainly, if what you say is true, both *Britain* and *Holland* have been guilty of an egregious Error in remaining quiet so long, since they never can be furnished

with a better, or juster, Motive to a War, in which they may reasonably expect to be joined, not only by *Spain* and *Sardinia*, but by all the rest of *Europe*: But, Sir, let me tell you, that the Conduct of our Court, and the Proceedings of those of *Madrid* and *Turin*, shew that your Information has been altogether as false, in Regard to *France's* now having any longing Eye on the Emperor's Dominions in *Italy*, as your Judgment has been weak in believing, and you, yourself, indiscreet and rash, in entertaining the Publick with so idle, and so preposterous, a Story.

IT must be allowed, nevertheless, that the *French* have formerly made several bold Attempts upon that Country, but then they had very plausible Pretensions to *Naples*, *Sicily*, and the *Milaneze*; at present they have none: And whatever Efforts they made, in Pursuit of their Pretensions, and how successful soever those Efforts were in the Beginning, they always turned to their Disadvantage in the End. The History of *France* bears ample Testimony of this; but if you are unwilling to be concluded by it, you may consult *Rapin's* History of *England*, where that Affair is set in a very just and clear Light. Since *Charlemagne's* Time (when *Europe* was in quite another Situation from what it is at present) the *French* Court has had but very little Reason to boast of her Acquisitions in *Italy*, except it has been of Graves for her Soldiers there. Several fatal Experiments have convinced *Frenchmen*, to their Cost, that it is but mere Madness in them to think of ever annexing any Part of the *Italian* Dominions to the Crown of *France*: And equal Madness will it be in any *Briton* to believe that *Spain* and *Sardinia* would employ their Swords, and their Treasure, to conquer new Dominions for the *French* Monarch on that Side, which would not only endanger their own Possessions and Liberties, but, very probably, render him two powerful for the rest of the Princes of *Europe*. No, Sir; believe no such Thing: I have just told you that the Conduct of the Courts of *Madrid* and *Turin* moves upon a quite different Principle; they Conquer for themselves, and *France* only lends them her Assistance in *Italy* to ruin the Emperor, and strip him of his Dominions

Dominions there: But for this Piece of Service I acknowledge she expects a Return of Assistance elsewhere, upon a proper Opportunity; and his Catholick Majesty has lately * declared the Interests of *France* and *Spain* to be inseperable. Had you then, instead of *France*, said the *House of Bourbon* seems by her Conduct to have had a longing Eye on the Emperor's Dominions in *Italy* and the *Netherlands* these many Years, you had certainly been in the Right.

BUT I have nothing to object to the second Part of your Assertion, that "the Resentment which the *French King* has shewed for the Emperor's Opposition to *Stanislaus*, is but a Pretence to cover his Lust of Power, and Increase of Dominions." This admits of no fair Contradiction, it being now well known, that King *Stanislaus* expressed the utmost Unwillingness to renew his Pretensions to the Crown of *Poland* on the Death of King *Augustus*. "I am now in Years, says the generous, honest *Stanislaus*; I have no Son to provide for; my Daughter is Queen of *France*, an Advancement as much above my Ambition, as it was beyond my Hopes: Why should I then set all *Europe* in a Flame, ruin my Country, and, perhaps, sacrifice Millions of Lives, by grasping at a Crown, which, by the Course of Nature I must not flatter myself to wear any considerable Time? The Summit of my Desires is to spend the Remainder of my Days in Quiet at *Chambort*; It is the only Favour I request of the King my Son-in-Law."---These, Sir, were the honest, the noble Sentiments of King *Stanislaus*; he abhorred the Thoughts of a Throne which he saw he could not reach to but over the Ruin of his Country, and, perhaps, of *Europe* too: But as the Court of *Versailles* had quite other Views, *Stanislaus* was not at Liberty to persist in the gallant Resolution he had taken to despise a Crown attended with so many Horrors. The Ruin of the Emperor would infallibly aggrandize *France*, even tho' she should possess no Part of his Dominions: The Opportunity to ruin him, offered itself upon the Death of King *Augustus*; and King *Stanislaus*, notwithstanding all his Reluctance to trouble the World again

* See his Exposition, or Manifesto published last Winter.

again, found himself obliged to submit to the Will and Pleasure of the Ministers of *France*, and the Ambition of her Monarch. He was forced away to *Poland* in the Disguise of a *Valet de Chambre*, and performed all the troublesome and fatiguing Duties of One, until his Arrival in *Poznań*: What has since happened in *Poland* every body knows. In the mean Time, *Spain* and *Sardinia* took Fortune by the Forelock: *Naples* and the *Milanese* are now intirely in their Hands; *Sicily* is near being lost: And when the Emperor is quite drove out of *Italy*, the *French* have their Ends on that Side, and *Flanders* falls next; get it who can. The *Ballance of Power* will then be lost, tho' the *French* don't keep one Foot of Ground in *Italy*, and the Liberties of *Europe* in much greater Danger, than at the Time of making the Grand Alliance in 1701, because the *House of Bourbon*, especially the *Spanish* Branch of it, is grown infinitely more powerful than she was at the Accession of *Philip V.*

AS to King *Stanislaus's* Election, I need not say much to it, since I acknowledge with you, and have much better Reasons than any you furnish me with for doing so, that it has not been the real Ground-Work to the present War in *Italy* and *Germany*, tho' *France* has made it the Pretext; but I must observe, that the Condition you propose of a King of *Poland's* being elected *without a single Opponent*, is much more against *Augustus* than *Stanislaus*: It is what I believe the *Poles* have never seen, or, at least, but very seldom; and every Body knows that the late King *Augustus* could plead no such Election against his Competitor the Prince of *Conti*, who had a Majority of Suffrages. Could then Monsieur * *Le Normand* himself have pleaded the Cause of King *Stanislaus*, and defended the Measures of the *House of Bourbon* in stronger and more significant Terms than you have done, in saying, "That had *Stanislaus* been freely and duly elected without a single Opponent, *France* had been justifiable in vindicating *Stanislaus's* Right against any Power that should have interposed in Behalf of *Augustus*." This, Sir, is saying a great deal in Favour of the Conduct of

* A Famous Advocate in the Parliament of *Paris*, much made use of in drawing up Manifestos for the Court of *France*.

of *France*, and opens her a large Field of Chican to palliate her Proceedings; for whether *Stanislaus* was duly elected or not, it cannot be denied that he had much fewer Opponents amongst the qualified Electors than *Augustus*; and that the latter's Party was so inconsiderable in *Poland*, that he durst not set his Foot in that Kingdom, even at the Head of his *Saxon* Troops, until a numerous Army of *Russians* had prepared the Way for him. So far then your Argument has made the Pretensions of *Stanislaus* better than those of *Augustus*, and the Proceedings of *Louis XV*, much more justifiable than those of the Czarina. What you say farther in Justification of her Czarinian Majesty rather makes the Matter worse *, and shews us, that had *Stanislaus* been ever so freely and duly elected, the Czarina would not suffer him to reign in *Poland*, because he had formerly been set over the *Poles* by a hot-headed *Knight-Errant*, who was one of the greatest Enemies that *Peter* the Great had, and one of the most unreasonable and turbulent Neighbours that the *Russians* could be plagued with: Therefore you very gravely conclude the Empress of *Russia's* Opposition to be just and reasonable, and the Emperor's no less so, because he had rather see a Prince of the *Empire*, and one whose Interest is linked with his own, King of *Poland*, than one who cannot be otherwise than a Tool of *France*. But, good Sir, do you call this reasoning; or, has *France* paid you for it? Is the private Pique of the Czarina, and the particular Interests of the Emperor, to be put in the Place of Right; and are not the *Poles* at Liberty to chuse a King but what must suit with the Humour and Conveniency of those great Powers? If so, the Death of every King of *Poland* must furnish a new War for *Europe*, as long as the *Poles* enjoy the Right of electing their Princes. But you might have given the Argument a better, I mean an honester, Turn, and shewn the Intrigues and dishonest Practices of the French Court in gaining the Cardinal Primate of *Poland*, and corrupting the *Poles* to sell *Stanislaus* their Votes which she found Money to purchase: This Method would have exposed the Faultiness of his Election in a much stronger Light than you have set it. You might also have been a little more civil to the

Memory

* See the Letter, Page 6.

Memory and Character of a crowned Head, who had more Virtues, and fewer Vices, than most Princes of his Age ; It is *Charles XII*, I mean, who did no more against *Peter the Great*, and the late King of *Poland*, than what any courageous, brave Prince would have done under the same Provocations. For this Reason, and as *Stanislaus* has laid no Claim to the Crown of *Poland* by Virtue of his former Possession, I think you might have declined raking so rudely into the Ashes of the Hero of *Sweden* ; but I won't say you used him so basely to irritate the whole *Swedish* Nation against your Country, and provoke them to join *France* and her Allies.

IN your next Paragraph, indeed, you speak more like an *Englishman*, and I see very little in it that can admit of any material Objection. That *France* has a Design to keep *Lorrain* is beyond Dispute ; but I will not be altogether so positive as to the Elector of *Bavaria's* Views on the Imperial Dignity, in which, no doubt but *Louis XV* would assist him with all his Power, if he saw no Probability of obtaining it for himself ; because, as you well observe, *he would be in no Danger of losing Lorrain, could be once raise the Duke of Bavaria to the Seat of Empire*. *Lorrain* is a morsel which the Court of *France* has been long gaping at ; *Louis XIV* had like to have compassed it ; and as *France* seldom lays aside any practicable Views, tho' she may sometimes defer them through Policy, or Want of proper Opportunities, we have seen a Scheme of an Accommodation lately inserted in our News-Papers, which would entirely give her up *Lorrain*, and, not only so, but make his most Christian Majesty the Sovereign Dictator of *Europe*. Tho' I neither believe every Article in a News-Paper, nor can ever imagine that our Ministers will give that Scheme any other Reception than the Disdain and Contempt it deserves ; yet, as I am pretty sure it was hatched in the *Jesuit's College of Louis le Grand, Rue St. Jaques a Paris*, I shall insert it at length, with some necessary Remarks upon it, as a *Caveat* to my Country.

I. " THAT

I. " THAT the Elector of *Saxony* shall be King of *Poland*, and
 " the Crown be made Hereditary in his Family."

TO this Article I have several Objections, and would ask, in the first Place, what Authority have We, or any other Powers in *Europe*, to dispose of the Liberties of *Poland*, and divest the *Poles* of their Rights? The *Poles* not only claim, but have always enjoy'd the Right of electing their Princes; the *Grandeess* and Gentlemen of *Poland* will always be tenacious of so glorious a Privilege; their Consent must be had before any Change can be made in the Constitution, but by Constraint; and if we have any Hand in such a Constraint, we not only commit an Act of Injustice, but set a dangerous Precedent to other Nations to intermeddle in our own Domestick Affairs. Here seems then to be a Snake in the Grass, or at least a Lure thrown out to draw the Elector of *Saxony* entirely into the Interest of *France*: This will appear still plainer in the Second Article.

II. " THAT *Lorrain* shall be established into a Kingdom, and
 " be given to King *Stanislaus*, revertible to the Crown of *France*."

WHEN we consider King *Stanislaus's* Way of Thinking, we need not doubt of his closing with an Offer that carries so many Advantages in it. The Enjoyment of not only the Title, but the Dominions and Power of a King, attended with a handsom Revenue, besides Peace and Tranquillity, is, no doubt, much preferable to the Thorns that must surround the Crown of *Poland*, if he wears it: Moreover, he will then be near the Queen his Daughter, to make the Exchange more agreeable to him: And, to crown the whole, he prevents the Ruin of his Country, whose Interest he has always been known to prefer to that of his Family, when he was Master of his Actions. These Things considered, I say, we need not doubt his Consent: But how must we *Britons* behave? If we refuse ours, King *Augustus* will lay the Cause of his Disappointment, and the Difficulties

he may meet with, at our Door ; he will look upon us as the sole Obstacle to the Advancement of his Family, and, upon that Account, become our secret Enemy. But if we agree to so dangerous a Proposition, we lessen our own Power, by encreasing that of *France* : We add at least Twelve Millions of Livres a Year, and near a Million of Subjects, to the *French* Crown ; besides the Importance of the Situation of *Lorrain*. Behold then the Jesuitical Snare laid for us !

III. " THAT the Duke of *Lorrain* shall marry the Arch-Dutchess, " eldest Daughter of the Emperor, and be elected King of the Ro- " mans."

TO this Article I have no Objection, and therefore proceed to the next.

IV. " THAT Don *Carlos* shall marry the second Arch-Dutchess, " and the Emperor give him up all the Claims he has in *Italy*."

THIS Article seems, at first View, the most likely of any in the whole Scheme to put an End to the present War in *Europe* ; but if we look upon it a little nearer, we shall see it attended with almost insuperable Difficulties. How much soever *France* may seem for this Match in Appearance, she may, perhaps, throw in underhand Obstacles in favour of some Princess of the *House of Bourbon* ; but if she consents to it, I am afraid it will be with such Views, and on such Terms, as may hereafter embarrass us more than ever. For if the Arch-Dutchess should die without Issue, a Thing no Way impossible, pray must Don *Carlos* keep *Naples* and *Sicily* after her Death, and how long ? If he must, will it not be a wrong done to the eldest Arch-Dutchess, and the Prince she marries ? In such a Case, will not the Emperor's Consent be forced from him ? Will not *Spain* have Obligations to *France* for the Force put on his Imperial Majesty ? And must not Don *Carlos* always depend on the Court of *Versailles* for Assistance against the Prince, who may hereafter demand the Restitution of

of those Dominions, in Right of his Wife the eldest Arch-Duchess? In my Mind, this Affair demands a very serious and deliberate Consideration before we finish it, that it may not engage us in a War, when; perhaps, we may be under greater Disadvantages to begin one, than we are at present. But let us look on the other Side of the Picture: It is much more pleasing, and gives us better Hopes of the Issue. If this Match can be made by the Negotiation of *Great-Britain* and *Holland*, exclusive of *France*, then *Spain* and *Don Carlos* must owe the Success of it to *Us* and the *Dutch*, and, consequently, depend upon our Aid, in Case of any Disturbance from the *French* Court. But I decline pushing this Point any farther; because I will not presume to anticipate the Wisdom and Judgment of our Ministers, to which I shall always pay a due and respectful Submission.

V. " THAT the *Milaneze* shall be given to the King of *Sardinia*,
 " except some Places which shall be joined to the Dutchies of *Parma*,
 " *Placentia*, and *Tuscany*, which shall be given to the Infante Don
 " *Philip*."

HERE we may observe these Schemists disposing of Principalities and Dominions as magisterially, and with as little Justice, as they bestow Prizes in their Tragedy once a Year, in their own Territories in *Rue St. Jacques*. What Equivalent have they found for the Emperor in lieu of the Dutchy of *Milan*? Really none at all; nor do they design him any by this Article, which flatly contradicts the foregoing one. By the fourth Article his Imperial Majesty is only to give up all the Claims he has in *Italy*, in Consideration of his Daughter's Marriage with *Don Carlos*, which is some sort of Equivalent; but here the much greatest Part of the *Milaneze* goes quite out of the *House* of *Austria*, to the King of *Sardinia*, and the rest to *Don Philip*: The Emperor's Daughter is not to have an Inch of it; and, perhaps, the Part to be allotted to *Don Philip* may not remain long in his Possession, without throwing all *Europe* into a new War. The Prince of *Asturias* is of a very crazy, sickly Constitution, and the Physicians

think he can't live many Years ; but if he dies without Issue, Don Carlos becomes King of *Spain* after the Demise of his Father, or, perhaps, before it, in Case of a second Abdication. Upon such an Accession of Grandeur and Power, he may then think himself injured in being defeated of the Inheritance of the *House of Parma*, and the Consideration for a Brother will be but of small Weight, when thrown into the Scale against Ambition, the Lust of enlarging his Dominions, and the Interest of his own Children. In such a Case, how will the King of *Sardinia* too be secure in the Possession of his Part of the *Milaneze* ? For if Don Carlos becomes King of *Spain*, he will certainly put in for it, and pray who shall defend it ? Must it be the *House of Austria*, with *England* and *Holland*, or must it be *France* ? Wherefore let us look which way we will, the Partition of the Imperial Dominions in *Italy*, requires a great deal of Thought.

VI. " THAT the Dutchy of *Mantua* shall be given to the Duke of *Lorrain's* Brother."

THIS, indeed, is very complaisant to *France*, for the Trouble she has given to *Europe*. *France* must have *Lorrain* ; the Duke's Brother must be sent packing from the Inheritance of his Forefathers, and the Land of his Nativity, to take Possession of a precarious Dutchy, which he never will be able to defend ; and the *House of Austria* must be stript of more of its Dominions, without any Equivalent, to put *France* in good Humour. Commend me to the *French* Politicks ! If the Duke of *Lorrain's* becoming King of the *Romans* is such an Eye-sore to *France*, why may not the making his Brother Duke of *Lorrain*, remove that Eye-sore ? Certainly it may, if *France* means honestly ; for that Brother, notwithstanding his Relation to the King of the *Romans*, must be obliged to live as his Father before him did, and keep Measures with the *French* Court for fear of losing his Dominions.

VII. " THAT the Kingdom of *Bohemia*, with the Title of King, shall be given to the Elector of *Bavaria*, and made Hereditary in his Family."

AS

AS the Elector's Wife is Niece to the present Emperor, and Daughter to the last, this Article does not bear quite so hard on the House of Austria, as on the Rest of Europe. For tho' *Bobemia* remains with the Descendants of a Female Branch of that House, yet by the lopping off so considerable a Member from his Imperial Majesty's Dominions, after the Partition of those in *Italy*, the next Emperor will become much less able to oppose the *Turk* (the constant Ally of his most Christian Majesty) than the late Emperor *Leopold* was; consequently *Europe* will be in much greater Danger than heretofore, on that Side: And, at the same Time, the House of *Bavaria* will be more than ever attached to the House of *Bourbon*, as the only Means that can keep them in Possession of their new acquired Kingdom, especially since, as you say, his Electoral Highness keeps so jealous an Eye already on the Duke of *Lorrain*. Is this a Plan then for restoring Peace, and preserving the Balance of Power; or is it a Project for entailing a War upon *Europe*, and destroying her Liberties to all Intents and Purposes? But let us see the next Article.

VIII. "THAT *Luxembourg* shall be dismantled, and given up to *France*."

GOOD again! more Grist to *France's* Mill! The Country about *Luxembourg* will always afford a Revenue sufficient to maintain a strong Garrison there, should *France* find a proper Opportunity to re-fortify it, in order to bridle all that Part of the *Netberlands*, if she can't get the whole. We have already found her Fingers itching to re-establish the Fortifications of *Dunkirk*, notwithstanding the most solemn Treaties, and the favourable Terms we granted her, when she was no longer in a Condition to defend herself. I have seen the new Works towards repairing the Harbour; the Town is all strongly pallisaded about; in the Year 1729, three Engineers were sent thither from the Court of *Versailles*, to measure the Ground, and draw out the Plan of a new Fortification, much more spacious, and stronger than the old One: Can *Britons* then be stupid enough to believe that *France* will be more scrupulously

scrupulously just to her Treaties in regard to *Luxembourg*, than she has already been in regard to *Dunkirk*; or, that *she will keep any Treaties at all, when she thinks she can break them with Advantage to herself, or even with Impunity from her Neighbours?* Raze *Luxembourg* as much as you please; do but give it up to *France*, and then a fair Opportunity re-fortifies both *It* and *Dunkirk*, in spite of our Teeth. Now let us see the Dragon's Tail to this monstrous Project.

IX. "THAT the *Czarina* shall send an Ambassador to the King (not the King of *France*, or the most Christian King, but the King *tout court*, which shews the Plan to be entirely *French*) "to acknowledge him *Emperor of the French*, and give him the Precedency; and the King shall acknowledge her Majesty the Empress of the two *Russias*."

THIS, perhaps, I was a Part of *Monfieur de Beftang's* Instructions to the Court of *Petersburgh*. But, for God's Sake, why must King *Louis XV.* be *Emperor of the French*, and King *George II.* not be *Emperor of the Britons*? One Crown is altogether as independant and Imperial, as the other: But we may easily see into the Designs of *France*, in this new Title for her young Monarch. The Seat of Empire was in the *French* Nation before it was transferred to the *Germans*; The *French* Ministers have a Mind it should be so again; and, perhaps, they think this a proper Opportunity to begin the first Step towards it. When *Louis XV.* has once assumed the Title of *Emperor of the French*, and been acknowledged as such by the *Czarina*, he will expect no less Complaisance from the other Powers of *Europe*; or, perhaps, take a proper Oecasion to quarrel with those who refuse it; so that this new Title, how Chimerical soever it may appear at present, may prove the Foundation of such Disturbances and endless Dishonour to *Britains*. For if our Sovereign acknowledges *Louis XV.* for *Emperor of the French*, he must strike the *Lilies* out of the Arms of *Great-Britain*, lay aside the Title of *King of France*, and give the *French Emperor* Precedency of *Courtesy*; whereas we have hitherto claimed the Precedency in all Treaties and Negotiations whatever; and, on the other

other Hand, if we refuse him that *Title*, when other Powers have acknowledged it, I ask, whether any of those Powers would take our Part in a War, which *France* might make with us, for not doing as they themselves had done? To assist us in such a War, would be to condemn their own Conduct.

IN a Word, every Thing in this hopeful Scheme, seems expressly calculated for the Aggrandizement of *France*, and the Ruin of *Britain*: But before I quit it, I must make one Remark more. In this proposed Partition of the Emperor's Dominions, no Manner of Notice is taken of those in the *Neiberlands*, *Luxembourg* excepted; and for this, the Reason is plain. *France* has a Design on those Countries, which it is not yet proper to mention; but when she has rent away the Emperor's Dominions in *Italy*, and good Part of those in *Germany*, and divided them between *Spain*, *Sardinia*, and *Bavaria*, she intends to seize the *Austrian Neiberlands* for herself: And, pray, who shall hinder her? *Britain* and *Holland* alone can't do it; and the Emperor will then be too weak to make any material Efforts, either towards his own Relief, or our Defence. This brings me back to your Letter, from which I have made a Sort of Digression; but I hope my Readers will not think it either too long, or any way unnecessary.

I AM very sorry, Sir, that I can't pay the same Deference to your Fourth Paragraph, that I have done to the Third; for, as I have said before, I am morally sure that *France* has no View, especially at this Time, to the retaining any Part of *Italy* to herself. The *French* Ministers, whose real Designs I think I know as well as any Man in *Britain*, are better Politicians than to attempt such an Impossibility, and are convinced that the least Step towards such an Attempt, would make *Spain* and *Sardinia* immediately fall off from them, and accommodate Matters with the *House of Austria*. Nor, as I have just said, is *Louis XV.* near so much concerned for King *Stanislaus's* Interest, as his own, in the present War: But I readily grant you, that his Intent

“ is to reduce the Emperor so low, as to bring him to his own Terms,
“ and

“ and to defeat the Measures taken in favour of the Duke of *Lorain*. ” This is what I shall always agree with you in ; and I wish I had Reason to do so in what follows, where you first ask, In the Name of Wonder, what the Allies have done in *Italy*, and then, in the same Breath, without mentioning any Particulars, immediately answer, Very little : But, Sir, is this to make us regardless of our own Interest, and the Danger of the *House of Austria* ? However it be, let us put this Answer to the Touchstone ; let us examine what Progress the Allies have made in that Country. When we do so, we shall find that the Conquest of all the *Milaneze* and *Naples*, has been but the Work of seven Months, exclusive of the Time passed in Winter-Quarters ; that all *Sicily*, except the Citadel of *Messina*, and the Castle of *Gonzague*, is now in the Hands of *Don Carlos* ; that the *Spaniards* alone entirely defeated the *Imperialists* at *Bitonto*, and destroyed their whole Army ; and that the *French* and *Sardinian* Army have, this Campaign, defeated the Emperor’s, in two pitched Battles, at *Parma* and *Guasalla*, tho’ the *Germans* fought with the utmost Bravery and Conduct, and did all that gallant, courageous Soldiers, could possibly perform. Now, Sir, do you call this rapid, this surprizing Progress of the Allies, Doing very little ? If you do, I am at a loss to know what you would call, Doing very much. “ But all these Conquests in *Italy*, you say, “ are no Subjects of great Triumph, while *Mantua* holds out against “ them. ” I wish, with all my Heart, that you may be found in the Right, and that a Turn of Fortune, in favour of the *House of Austria*, may justify your Opinion : But, I must own, I am in despair of ever seeing that happy Day, while *Great Britain* and *Holland* continue either inactive Spectators of the Emperor’s Distress, or Mediators for an Accommodation that bears any Tendency to the Scheme I have mentioned, or to any Thing like it. Such an Accommodation will yield up to *France*, and her Allies, the Point for which they have disturbed all *Europe* ; and not only so, but lay the Ground-Work of future Disturbances, and new Wars. Is it not then much better, to draw the Sword, than waste our Time to strengthen the common Disturbers of *Christendom* ? The *French*, in general, are a gallant, polite, and generous Nation ;
they

they are every Way amiable: But they differ very much from their Court, which treats them with as little Justice and Humanity, as she would do the rest of *Europe*, had she the Power to extend her Tyranny. The Court of *Versailles*, we have often called, *the most over-bearing, insolent Court, in the Universe, when Fortune follows her Standard; abject and supple in Adversity: But whether victorious, or vanquished, always tricking in her Treaties, and perfidious in the Execution of them.* This is the Character we plentifully bestowed upon her in several Pamphlets, in the Reign of the late *Queen Anne*: But whether we did that Court Justice, or not, is what I shall not venture to determine; my Opinion only is, that if we would keep the House of Austria sufficiently powerful for preserving the Balance, and maintaining a good Barrier against the Turk, we must assist her in Time; and that if we would have a good Peace in Europe, we must cut out one with the Edge of the Sword: For if we negotiate any farther for a general Peace, with the Allies, while they are flushed with Victory and Conquests, we shall negotiate upon very disadvantageous Terms, and consume a great deal of precious Time, to very little Purpose.

AND now, to examine the great Stress you lay upon the Emperor's still holding *Mantua*, I must observe to you, that the Possession of the *Mantuan* does not, by any Means, counterbalance the Success of the Allies. His Imperial Majesty had that Place before the Beginning of this War, as well as all the other Places which he has since lost; but the holding of *Mantua* has not been sufficient, either to preserve the *Milaneze*, *Naples*, and *Sicily*, or to prevent his Defeats at *Bisonto*, *Parma*, and *Guaftalla*. Wherefore *Mantua*, without an Army in the Field superior to that of the Allies, will be but of little Service to the House of Austria; and as it is morally impossible for his Imperial Majesty, after so many repeated Defeats, and such great Losses, as well of Men, as of Towns and Countries, to bring such an Army together, we may reasonably look upon *Mantua* itself to be in no small Danger of following the Fate of the rest of his Dominions in *Italy*. There will then be an End to the War on that Side; and we must expect to see it

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wholly transferred to *Flanders* and *Germany*, and perhaps to *Great Britain*, supported by the whole Power of the Three united Crowns, and, not impossibly, with that of *Bavaria* into the Bargain.

I NOW come to the Campaign on the *Rhine*, where, you say, much less has been done than in *Italy*. This is certainly true; but when we consider every thing, we shall find that much more has been done there, than any honest, thinking *Briton* can look on, without a great deal of Uneasiness, and equal Repentment. To lessen the Disadvantage of the Emperor and Empire on that Side, you are pleased to tell us, that you believe the Prudence of Prince *Eugene* has, by Delay, preserved what the Rashness of a *Merci* would have lost by this Time. But pray, Sir, why so hard upon the Memory of the brave Count *Merci*? The Great *Eugene* needs no Foil to heighten the Lustre of his Conduct; nor can he be pleased with a Panegyrick on himself, which is tagged with a Satire on a gallant Fellow-Soldier, for whom he had the greatest Consideration and Friendship. If Prince *Eugene's* prudent Delay has, as you believe, preserved what Count *Merci's* Rashness would have lost, may we not naturally infer, that had his Highness hazarded a Battle with the Marshal *D'Asfeldt*, he might, very probably, have withered all his former Lawrels, and added another Defeat of the *Germans*, to encrease the Triumphs of the *French*? So that, now I think on't, what you say is, in the mean, no great Compliment to the Prince; but I believe every body will not only take it as a very large one to the Marshal, but look on it too as a very ill Presage for *Great Britain*. However, to console us again, you say, "We may be sure that all the Power of *France*, and her Allies, " will never be able to touch the *Circles*:" But as this is a Jargon, which I don't very well understand, I am terribly afraid you speak contrary to your own private Sentiments, as well as to all our own Publick News-Papers. The *French*, tho' the *Rain* and the *Rhine* seemed to have leagued against them, took the important Fortrefs of *Philipsburg*, just under the Nose of the *German* Army, commanded by no meaner a General than the mighty *Eugene* himself. They have also ravaged

ravaged several Parts of those *Circles*, which you assure us they will never be able to touch ; and ravaged them too in a very lamentable Manner : *They have raised Contributions there sufficient to pay their Troops this Summer* ; whereas the *Germans* have raised none from the Dominions of *France*. And thus the *Marshal D'Asfeldt*, by following the Plan of his great Master the late Duke of Berwick, has obliged the *Circles* to maintain the French Army this Campaign, tho' the Emperor could not prevail upon them to grant a sufficient Supply to the Military Chest of the Empire, in a Time of such imminent Danger. Wherefore all *Europe*, and you in the Number too, must allow this to have been a very profitable Campaign for *France*, tho' I find you no way disposed to call it a glorious one ; and I will venture to add, that two or three more such Campaigns, will ruin the Empire to all Intents and Purposes, notwithstanding your round Assertion, which I must repeat again, " That all the Power of *France*, and her Allies, will never be able to " touch the *Circles*. " But, I suppose, you mean, if the Elector of *Bavaria* does not join the Alliance ; tho', at the same Time, you seem to apprehend he only waits a proper Opportunity, to add one to the Number of the Enemies we are likely to have on our Hands.

THUS, Sir, I don't hitherto see that you have offered any thing to convince us of what you are almost sure of yourself, that " *France*, " *Spain*, and *Sardinia*, have grasped an Object which they are unable " to hold, and which will crack their Joints before they are aware of " it : " But perhaps this Defect in your Letter, is to be attributed to the Brevity of it ; for that Reason I wish you had been a little more copious, and am fully persuaded that your Readers would have heartily pardoned you. For my Part, I entirely rely on their Indulgence in this Point, since I affect no Brevity at all ; and am humbly of Opinion, that the Allies will never let go their Hold, except *Great Britain* and *Holland* force them to it ; and that if their Joints remain uncrack'd, till the *House of Austria*, and the *Empire*, crack them, they are likely to continue long enough in a Condition to do much more Mischief in *Europe*.

AS to the Affairs of *Poland*, I think you are either very obscure, or at least very much puzzled, when you say, “ The Behaviour of “ *France*, in Relation to *Dantzick*, furnishes us with a glaring Instance “ of her Valour, Prudence, and Fidelity. ” This, I confess, you give us as an Irony ; but had you been serious, and said, it furnished an Instance of a Master-Piece of Policy, you had been much nearer the Point. If you please to reflect that the *Siege* of *Dantzick* was publickly talked of, as a Thing actually resolv’d upon three Months before the *Russian* Army appeared before the Place, you must allow that *France* might have prevented the Ruin of the *Dantzickers*, had she found it her Interest to do so. As she wanted neither Men, nor Money, nor Shipping, she could have dispatched away Succours two Months sooner than she did ; and, instead of sending three Battalions, she might, with the same Facility, have embarked a Dozen, especially since our Fleet was not ready to hinder them. Every Body allows, that had she done so, and as so able a Ministry would certainly have done, had they been as willing as able, the Place could not have been taken ; and therefore all Mankind was surprized at the Slowness of the *French* Preparations for the Relief of the brave, but too forward and too credulous, *Dantzickers*. But Men might stare, and wonder on as long as they pleased ; *France* had a more crafty Game to play, than either to prevent the *Siege*, or relieve the Town : Tho’, I must confess, it was a very perfidious and inhuman one. In all Appearance, the *French* Ministry foresaw, that the *Siege* of *Dantzick* would interrupt the *English* and *Dutch* Trade, not only to that City, but all over *Poland* ; and, upon that Account, incense *Great Britain* and *Holland* against the Court of *Petersbourg*. They likewise naturally supposed, that the Loss of so important a Port in the *Baltick*, would alarm the Princes of the *North*, and make the two great Maritime Powers of *Europe* jealous of the too growing Power of *Russia* by Sea. These, then, were no small Motives to the Conduct of the *French* Ministers, who, on the other Hand, knew very well, that the Loss of one Town could not sink the Affairs of King *Stanislaus* so low, as
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to leave his Friends in *Poland* destitute of Means to continue Disturbances, in that Quarter, sufficient to hinder the Elector of *Saxony* from sending his Troops to the Emperor's Assistance; whereas the Relief of *Dantzick*, and a Dozen Battalions of *French* thrown into the *Polish Prussia*, would probably have set King *Stanislaus* on the Throne of *Poland* once more, and thereby have hastened on a formidable Alliance against *France*. To these Reasons it is, that we may justly impute the Misfortune of *Dantzick*, and the Ruin of its generous and valiant Inhabitants; and, I believe, that whatever Nation or State is either credulous or foolish enough to listen to the Promises of the *French* Court, and rely on her *Bonne-Foi*, will speed no better in the Sequel, than the betrayed and deserted *Dantzickers* have done, when she finds it her Interest to abandon them to their Fate. But where Infatuation prevails over a People, no Example, or Warning from the Misfortunes of their Neighbours, can possibly save them: And this is the principal Reason why *France* has tricked and abused all the Nations of Europe by turns; BUT ENGLAND MUCH OFTENER THAN ANY,

AS to your Fifth Paragraph, Sir, it rolls too much upon the Conduct of our Ministers, for me to enter into Particulars with you: Their Stations and Abilities are so much superior to mine, that I shall rather look on their Measures with Respect and Deference, than presume to examine either the Cause or the Consequences of them. Our Sovereign has altogether as great an Interest in the Security of the present Settlement of the Crown in his August Family, as we can possibly have in the Security of our Liberties and Properties; His Majesty has done all that lies within the Compass of human Prudence, to perpetuate this mutual Security; therefore we have nothing to complain of, on that Head: But neither the Act of Settlement, nor the Constitution of Great Britain, can be safe, nay, they will infallibly be destroyed, if we suffer the House of Austria to be any farther distressed, or the House of Bourbon to grow any greater. A War with France and Spain will, no doubt, impede our Trade, and, perhaps, for a very long Time too, as you rightly observe; but if the House of Austria, and the Empire,
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are brought *too low*, and *France* rises upon their Ruins to a Pitch of Power and Grandeur that may endanger the Balance of *Europe*, pray *what becomes of our Trade then?* It will not only be impeded for a Time, but perhaps for ever; and we shall feel all the Misery attending the Loss of it, and our Liberty, to *Neighbours who have an hereditary Aversion to us, almost as old as their Monarchy*. There is no doubt but his Majesty will take all possible Precautions to prevent such an Evil; and that our Ministers have been hitherto in the Right, to endeavour, by amicable Means, to accommodate the present Quarrel between the *Houses of Austria and Bourbon*, is what I hope will not be denied by any reasonable Man, at least until we see the Result of their Conduct, and they have Time allowed them to shew us the Effects of their Wisdom, and the Integrity of their Intentions: But your Argument, that when we start to the Field, we shall start fresh upon the harassed and diminished Troops of the Enemy, is not talking like a Soldier. The beaten Side commonly loses most Men; and for this, Reasons, very obvious to the meanest Capacity, may be easily assign'd. The *Imperial* Troops will then, in all human Probability, be much more diminished than those of the Allies; by the Loss of *Sicily, Naples, and the Milanese*, the Emperor loses also a great Part of his *Finances*, which fall into the Possession of the Allies, to encrease their Exchequer, and enable them to carry on the War with greater Vigour; and instead of the *harassed Troops* you mention, *France, Spain, and Sardinia*, will have brave, experienced *Veterans* to face us with, when the Emperor will be reduced too low to furnish any considerable Number: They will have Troops flushed with Victory, and headed by Officers, who will have had Time given them to perfect themselves in their Profession; Troops trained up to War, and made familiar to Dangers, which untried Soldiers must have Time allowed them to acquire the necessary Military Courage to face. Such will be the Enemies we shall have to deal with, when we start fresh to the Field, if it be not very soon. And one Thing more, which I must observe to you, is, that whenever we start, we shall carry with us but a Parcel of raw, unexperienced Men, for our first Campaign; therefore
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the sooner we start, so much the better: For it is not the Exercise in *St. James's Park*, or the *Mews*, that makes either a brave Soldier, or a good Officer; 'tis Experience; and this Experience never can be acquired, but with Danger and Bloodshed. So that the longer we remain inactive, the worse provided we shall be; and the Enemy quite the contrary.

SUCH a Prospect ought indeed to incline us to an Accommodation, if possible to be obtained with Honour and Advantage, and I should be heartily glad to see a good one; but I hardly believe it can be procured, till *France* has received two or three hearty Defeats. In short, Sir, to make use of a homely Phrase, she must be drubbed into one: But of this there is very little Likelihood, except *We*, and the *Dutch*, take up the Cudgels. That *France* will treat with us, and make Peace too for a while, is what I make no manner of doubt of; provided we let her keep *Lorrain*, Don Carlos keep *Sicily* and *Naples*, with the other Dominions he pretends to in *Italy*, the King of *Sardinia* continue in the Possession of the *Milanese*, and King *Stanislaus* remain King of *Poland*: But this is the Article which she will least insist on. A Peace, upon this Footing, will content the Allies for the present. But, Sir, I hope this is not the Success which you would have attend the present Negotiations: If so, adieu to the Balance of *Europe*; adieu to the Trade and the Liberties of *Britain*. A very little Knowledge in History is sufficient to convince *Us*, that *France* never entered into a Treaty with *England*, but with a Design to deceive, and draw her into a Snare. Of this we have had sufficient Proofs towards the Close of the last Century, and in the Beginning of this we are in: But *Rapin* furnishes us with a glaring Instance of it in the Reign of our *Henry VII.* where we see the Perfidiousness of *Charles VIII.* of *France*, and his Ministers, in relation to the Affair of *Bretagne*, set forth in its proper Colours. *Henry VII.* thought himself a wise Man; but if he had been as wise, as he was covetous, he had saved us two hundred Millions of Pounds sterling, which the two last Wars cost us: For had he prevented *Bretagne* from falling into the Hands of the French King,

King, as he might easily have done, *France never could have been in a Condition to threaten all Europe with Chains, nor in Possession of Dunkirk, Brest, and St. Malo's, to ruin our Trade, and rob our Merchants.* But all this was the Consequence of our Treaties with *France*, and our depending on her *Bonne-Foi*, and her Oaths. Had, then, *Henry VII.* and his Ministers, lived to behold the dreadful Havock which the Privateers of *Bretagne* have made in the Trade of *England*, how would they have cursed their own Politicks, and their foolish Credulity! How little would they have seen a *Pension from France*, counterbalance the Loss and Dishonour which the taking of it had brought, not only upon *England* in particular, but upon all *Europe* in general!

THESE are dreadful Proofs how a Court, by taking either injudicious or mercenary Measures, may ruin the Nation it governs, tho' the Ruin does not immediately tread on the Heels of her Conduct.

WHEREFORE I conclude, that how inconvenient soever a War may be to us, or how desirous soever we may be of Peace, it is better draw the Sword, and throw away the Scabbard, than consent to any Accommodation at all, that does not CONTRACT the Bounds of *France*, instead of enlarging them: This is the only Way to secure our Trade from French Privateers for the future, save the House of Austria from farther Insults, and preserve the Balance of Europe in a just Poise. You say, We have no Reason ever to despair of the Alliance of *Holland*, and, in this, I hope you are in the Right; nay, I will not doubt it, notwithstanding the present Intrigues and strenuous Efforts of the French Ministry: For certainly so wise a People as the Dutch, never will trust the Faith and Cajoleries of *France*, after the unhappy Catastrophe of *Dantzick*. If they do, they depart from their antient Maxims and Politicks; and overlook an Advantage, to which an Alliance with *Great Britain*, and a War against *France*, now seems not only to invite, but even to persuade them with all its Rhetorick.

THE rest of your Letter is a little out of my Latitude, wherefore I stop here, and am,

S I R,

London Octob. 29,
1734.

Your most humble Servant.

P O S T S C R I P T.

AFTER I had finished this Letter, I met with a News Paper, in which I found the following Article.

“ *Paris, Octob. 8.* On the 28th past, the Cause of the late Mar-
“ quefs of *Tullibardine* (here called Duke of *Atbol*) who had been long
“ a Prisoner for Debt, was brought on before the Parliament of *Paris*:
“ The Plaintiffs were one *Divary*, joined by others of the Defendant’s
“ Creditors: The Point in Question was, Whether a Man of the De-
“ fendant’s Birth and Quality, was liable to have his Body confined for
“ Debt. The Arguments *pro* and *con*, were very learned, and strenu-
“ ously urged on either Side: The Counsel for the Defendant, was
“ Mr. *O’Hanlon*, a Gentleman born in *London*, but descended from an
“ ancient and noble Family in *Ireland*; he made a very eloquent
“ Discourse, in which he laid down, and elucidated the Privileges
“ which had been granted by *France* to the *Scots* Nation, and the Ad-
“ vantages all the *British* Subjects ought to enjoy in Consequence of
“ such Privileges, and by Virtue of the Peace of *Ryfwick*, and of that
“ of *Utrecht*. Messieurs *Lardelat* and *Savyard*, Gentlemen noted for
“ their Learning, Eloquence, and consummate Knowledge in the Law,
“ appeared for the Plaintiffs, and, with great Warmth, and Strength
“ of Reason, argued against Monsieur *Gilbert de Voisins*, Chief of
“ the King’s Counsel, who appeared for the King, and, with his

“ customary Eloquence, concluded in Favour of the Defendant. The
 “ Court, after mature Deliberation, decreed his Enlargement, and he
 “ was accordingly set at Liberty that Instant. It is certain, Mr. O’Han-
 “ lon rendered a signal Service to the Defendant ; and it is no small
 “ Advantage to the *British* Subjects, to have a Countryman, so able
 “ and so zealous to defend their respective Interests in a foreign King-
 “ dom. Mr. *Francia*, who was Solicitor in this Cause, was extreme-
 “ ly vigilant, and neglected nothing which could contribute to an hap-
 “ py Issue on the Part of the Defendant”.

NOW, Sir, this Article necessarily requires a Postscript to my Letter, because, it not only contains some material Errors, but may, at this Instant, render *France* too much Service, by giving *Britons* a Notion of her Justice, Impartiality and Friendship, which she no Way deserves.

IT was not the 28th of *September*, but near two Months sooner, that this remarkable Cause was pleaded by Mr. O’Hanlon ; for, to my Knowledge, the Defendant was enlarged several Days before I left *Paris*, which was on the 14th of last *August* ; but whether there has been a new Hearing on the 28th of *September*, is what I am entirely ignorant of, because, I was then in *London*.

AS to Mr. O’Hanlon’s Abilities, Eloquence and Zeal, to serve his Country, they are too well known in *Paris*, to admit of any Dispute ; wherefore, what this Article says of them, is certainly true : And also as true, that “ it is no small Advantage to the *British* Subjects, “ to have a Countryman so able and so zealous to defend their re- “ spective Interests in a foreign Kingdom”, where they are more liable to be insulted and injured, than, perhaps, in any other Kingdom in the Universe, through the hereditary Hatred of the French Nation to ours, and the little Regard they have to their Treaties with us, whenever they have an Opportunity to break them with Impunity. This is but too evident in the late barbarous and insolent Plunder of the *British* Subjects by the

the *Visa* in *France*; the frequent and daily Attempts to impose the *Capitation* on our Countrymen there, the exacting the *Droit d'Aubain* with the utmost Injustice and Rigour, the Case of the late Mr. *John Harold*, the new *Inquisition* against *Britons* in *France*, called *Lettres de Cachet*, and many other notorious Hardships and Vexations: All directly contrary to the Tenor of the Treaties of *Ryswick* and *Utrecht*. But it is to be hoped, that all these Grievances, Insults, and arbitrary Proceedings, will be amply provided against, in a Treaty for a general Pacification.

THAT there was a political Fetch in the Enlargement of the Gentleman, called in *France* the Duke of *Atbol*, will appear from the following Reasons. That Gentleman had been in Prison near three Years: as I have been informed; wherefore, if the Privileges, which had been "granted by *France* to the *Scots* Nations, and the Advantages all the "*British* Subjects ought to enjoy in Consequence of such Privileges, "and by Virtue of the Peace of *Ryswick*, and of that of *Utrecht*," were really thought of any Weight, why was a Person of so noble a Birth, and of so illustrious a Rank, detained so long in Confinement? Why were not those Privileges, so necessary to procure his Liberty, urged and insisted on two Years sooner? That they were not, is plain from the *Paris* Article it self; and the Reason for this Neglect, is altogether as plain. Such Privileges would have been looked upon as meer Chimæras by the *French*, I don't even except the *Parliament* of *Paris* it self, when there was no Appearance of a *Rupture* with *Britain*: But when a *Rupture* seemed almost unavoidable, as the *French* Court thought it did in *March* and *April* last; we are to suppose, that the Ministers of *France*, to curry Favour with the *Scots* Nation (by restoring them to Privileges which had been laid aside since the Reign of King *James* the First, but particularly since the Administration of the famous *Monsieur Colbert*) contrived the Titular Duke of *Atbol's* Enlargement, much in the Manner already related, the Error, as to the Time of his being enlarged, excepted; to shew, forsooth, the great Regard they paid to their Treaties with *Us*, and to the Privileges which

the *British* Subjects ought to enjoy in *France*. They had also another View in this Enlargement; For, as they were no Strangers to his titular, Graces, personal Bravery, and the great Interest and Credit he had in his Country, particularly among the *Atbol-men*, he was looked upon as a Person that could be highly serviceable to *France* in Case of a War with *Britain*. Behold, then, the true Reasons for setting him at Liberty, after almost three Years scandalous and severe Confinement, in the very worst and most loathsome * Prison in all *Paris*, when the Court of *Versailles* had no Errand to send him on, and no Drudgery to employ him in: When no such Work is in Hand, the Court of *France* is neither just nor human, nor even civil to the Subjects of *Great Britain*, who have either any Demands on her, or any Favours to ask; but the politest in the World, to such as have full Pockets, and go to *Paris* to throw away their Money.

IT has been also, with the same political View, that appears in the Case of the Titular Duke of *Atbol*, that several other *Scots* Gentlemen have been very much carressed of late, and, particularly, that one of that Nation, a Gentleman of confessed Courage and military Experience; but who, instead of ever having rendered any Service to *France*, had done her very considerable Damage, when he was a Governor in the *West-Indies*, in the Reign of Queen *Anne*, has had a Pension lately given him of four Thousand Livres a Year, which is double to what *France* usually gives to any of her own Lieutenant Generals, even of the most distinguished Merit and Service.

ADD to this, that the *Chevalier de St. George* has a Minister in *France*, who, since the Death of the late King *Augustus*, has been countenanced and regarded by the Court of *Versailles* in such a Manner, as to give Umbrage and Discontent to several foreign Ministers there: In a Word, Colonel *O'Brien* is as well known in *Paris* for the *Chevalier's* Minister, as his Excellency the Earl of *Waldegrave* is known for Ambassador from the King of *Great Britain*.

* The Petit Chatelet.

NOW, Sir, all these Circumstances plainly shew what Views and Designs *France* has been hatching of late, tho' perhaps, she may have laid those Designs aside for the present, because she finds, to her great Mortification, that the vigilant and wise Preparations of our Ministers have rendered them altogether impracticable, at this Juncture; and therefore thinks fit to listen to an Accommodation, in Hopes to gain Time, and a more favourable Opportunity to destroy us.

BUT, I hope that the same Vigilance and Wisdom in Gentlemen at the Helm of *Great Britain*, will always frustrate and defeat the Artifices of *France*, and, I don't doubt, if we really have an Accommodation, but that it will be a very advantageous one to *Britains*; that not only the before mentioned Grievances will be redressed; and *France* put out of a Condition to shackle us with the like for the future; but that *Dunkirk*, and some other Places, will be taken out of her Hands, and put in the Possession of some other Power, whose *Bonne-Foi* and Interest will leave us nothing to fear; and that * *English Tobacco* will be once more made a *Free Merchandize* in *France*. These Points, with those of sending away the *Chevalier's* Minister, and disbanding the *Irish* Re-

* In the Treaty of Commerce, concluded at *Utrecht*, is an Article, that *Tobacco* shall never be farmed again in *France*; but, indeed, this Article, with a few others, was to be left to the Decision of Commissaries, to be named on each Side, and, the Use I make of it, is only to shew, that the Farming of *Tobacco* in *France*, was looked upon, by our then Ministers, to be a Prejudice done to the Interest of *Great Britain*. If it was so, then, it is much more so at this Time; for, in a great Part of the Reign of *Louis XIV.*, the *Tobacco* was farmed at only One Million five hundred thousand *Livres* a Year; it rose afterwards to Two, and at last to Three Millions a Year. There it stood until Mr. *Law* came in Play, because the Farmers having a Practice of burning their Books at the End of every Year, their Profits never could be certainly known by the Ministers; but Mr. *Law*, naturally concluding, from that Practice, that those Profits must needs be very considerable, he obtained the Farm for the *Mississippi Company* at four Millions a Year: The Ministry, afterwards raised it on the present *India Company* in *France* to six Millions a Year. At this Rate it stood again until the Farmers got it out of their Hands, and gave eight Millions a Year for it, which, I believe, is treble to what the King of *Great Britain* makes of the Custom House Duty on that Commodity, through the Frauds in the Draw Back and other irregular Practices. Eight Millions a Year, is, then, the Contract with the Farmers who get eight Millions more per Ann. for themselves by that single Article; and this I am ready to demonstrate. Quere, then, as *Tobacco* is the Growth of our own Plantations, whether such a Sum does not more naturally belong to the Coffers of *Great Britain*, if we please to exert our selves, than to those of the Farmers in *France*? And whether so considerable an Article in Trade is not worthy the Attention of Englishmen.

giments in *France* and *Spain*, are essentially necessary to our Interest and Security : If the House of *Bourbon* refuses to comply with them, we way plainly see, that she neither means friendly nor honestly by us ; and, in such a Case, we may wrest them from her by Force of Arms, provided we have Recourse to them before the Emperor loses any more Ground.

BUT, an Accommodation upon any less Terms, will only add to the Power and Pride of *France* ; reduce us to a Condition, which even an unfortunate War can hardly do without a great Length of Time ; and leave us liable to be attacked, with greater Success than we can be at present, by so inveterate a Neighbour, as soon as she may meet with a fair Opportunity to make some certain Demands, which she reserves *in petto* to trump up against us, and ground a Quarrel upon, when, perhaps, she may have wormed us out of the Friendship of the *Dutch*, and intrigued the Ministers of *Vienna* into a Humour of being idle, it not pleased Spectators of our Ruin, in Return of *what* they will then call *our having abandoned their Master in the Time of his Distress*.

BUT, can any *Britain* ever believe, that his Country will abandon the House of *Austria* to the Designs of a Court, whose Picture is so well drawn, tho' in Miniature, in the following Letter, of which I accidentally found a printed Copy the other Day in a Coffee-House.

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A LETTER from Mr. FORMAN to a Friend  
in PARIS.

S I R,

IF my Friends were surprized at my leaving *Paris*, at a Time when they thought I had such happy Prospects from the Gratitude and Generosity of the Court of *France*, I believe they will wonder no less at the Route I took, and the Place I am in at present. To satisfy their

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Curiosity, then, and to justify my own Conduct, I shall now give you *some* of the Reasons I had for taking a Step, which I thought Duty commanded, and which Honour could not possibly avoid.

AS I have always had a very sincere Affection for the *French* Nation, and have made that Affection very useful to them upon several Occasions, you may easily believe it was no small Affair, that could prevail upon me to throw up such well-grounded Pretensions as I had to an Establishment in *France*, to sacrifice the justest Expectations of a handsome Provision for my Family, and to throw myself into the Hands of a Minister, from whom my Behaviour to him had left me nothing to hope, but every thing to dread from his Resentments; which, before this Time, might have crushed me to Atoms, had he not been generously pleased to suspend them this Month past that he has known of my being in Town: This Generosity I shall always acknowledge, with the same Gratitude that I now publish it.

YOU have, with the rest of the *British* Subjects in *Paris*, heard of the unprecedented and arbitrary Proceedings against the *Irish* College there; wherefore I shall avoid troubling you with many Particulars, which Charity, and the Laws of Decency, oblige me to conceal from the Publick, tho' they would contribute very much to the justifying of my Conduct in leaving *France*. All I shall tell you at this Time is, that when I saw the Priests of the *Irish* College treated not only with Cruelty, but even with a Barbarity shocking to human Nature, and that too by a mean-born worthless Wretch, who, meerly by Virtue of a *Lettre de Cachet*, calls himself Superior of the College; when I saw Gentlemen, who, tho' Priests, are still Subjects of *Great Britain*, and under Protection of the Treaties between the two Crowns, arbitrarily threatened to be sent to \* *Bicestree*, and put to Bread and Water, if they refused to obey Mr. *Bourk*; when I saw this *Bourk*, under the specious, but groundless and knavish, Pretence of reforming Manners, laying a Scheme for driving the Priests out of the College, and turning

\* A Prison and a House of Correction for Vagrants and Villains, as well as an Hospital for old Men.



it entirely into a Barrack for Recruits for the Irish Regiments in the Service of France: I say, when I saw these Things going forward, and all the *Arrets* of their late and present Most Christian Majesties, in Favour of the *College*, giving Place to a *Letter* from the *Chevalier de St. George*, and the Sollicitations of his Minister in *Paris*, and wholly set aside to continue *Bourk* in a Place, out of which he had been unanimously thrown at the last Election of Superiors, I found myself obliged to remonstrate to the Ministry, that such Proceedings not only combated, but overthrew, to all Intents and Purposes, the Arguments I had made Use of in Print, to persuade my Country of the *Sincerity* and *Bonne-Foi* of the Court of France. Along with that Remonstrance I humbly desired that the *College* might immediately be redress'd, as a Thing which not only Justice demanded, but true Policy, and the Interest of France, required; since, if the *British* Ministry should come to hear of the Part the *Chevalier* and his Minister had in that Affair, and the great Regard shewn to them upon all Occasions, (*particularly in every Thing relating to the British Subjects*) it might, perhaps, prove a Means to hasten a War, instead of that *Neutrality* which France seemed so much to desire of *Great Britain*, and really to want, in that critical Juncture.

NOW, Sir, I believe that every Man, who knows how zealously, and how publickly, I have pleaded the Cause of France, and how strenuously I have recommended her *Bonne-Foi* (tho' he may still remain ignorant of the Services I have render'd her, which never appear'd in Print) will readily conclude, that I had a Right, both in Regard to my own Honour, and my Country, not only to make that Remonstrance, but also to desire a Redress for the *College*: But what was the Consequence? — Tho' I had made that Remonstrance and Request in the most secret Manner, and none were privy to them but the Ministers themselves, to whom they were address'd, yet they were immediately communicated to *Abbé Vaubrun*, and by him as immediately communicated to *Bourk*. This was an ungenerous Proceeding, which I should never have come to the Knowledge of, had *Bourk's* Moderation

tion been equal to his Hypocrisy; but, as he was bursting with Vanity, to see the *Court* so inflexibly support his Plan, he blabb'd out the whole Affair two Days after in the Refectory of the College. It is true, he condescended to conceal my Name, by honouring me with the Title of an *English* Lord, but, at the same Time, was so particular and circumstantial in other Respects, that I was quickly guessed at to be the Person he meant. Notice was therefore sent me of it immediately, and I resolv'd to bid *France* and her Ministers adieu.

PURSUANT to the Resolution I had taken, I wrote to the Ministry some Days after, for a Pass for me and my Family to go to *Liege*, that I might be far enough off from my Enemies, who, I found, had too much Credit and Power for me to be safe in the *French* Territories, and whose Countenances boded me no Good: But this Request was likewise deny'd me the 14th of last July, by politely telling me, I had no Occasion for a Pass to go to \* *Liege*. This Answer, I must own, provok'd and shock'd me very much. In my Heart I accus'd *France* of Injustice, and her Ministers of Ingratitude; but perhaps I injur'd them: A Man may sometimes judge too partially, and too favourably in his own Cause. But, be that as it will, as my Services had highly deserved a much greater Favour, and as a Pass could not be fairly deny'd me by the Tenor of our Treaties, as I was a Subject of *Great Britain*, I quickly understood the Language of the Refusal, and was resolv'd not to venture over the *Frontiers* without one. Very probably some People thought I had no other Road to take, since, for the same Reasons, I could no more be in Safety in *Spain* than in *France*; and imagin'd I never would venture into *England*, where I had taken so much Pains to provoke Sir ROBERT WALPOLE, and make him my Enemy: But in this I had the Courage, and I hope the Event will shew I had the good Sense, to undeceive them. Sir ROBERT'S

\* *Placards* had been published some Time before, obliging every one to take a Pass that design'd to go out of the Kingdom; and the *British* Subjects are oblig'd to take Passes in the Sea-Ports to return home. The Moment I arriv'd at *Dieppe*, I took out one, and embark'd the Evening before the Post could come in to prevent me.



greatest Enemies have, to my Knowledge, allow'd him the Virtues of Generosity and Good-Nature; and the Royal Clemency of our Sovereign has been conspicuously manifested upon numberless Occasions. I thought it, then, much more consistent with my Duty and Honour, to have Recourse to them, than to continue any longer in a Place where fatal Necessity, and Self-Preservation, would not only oblige me to Silence, tho' I should see the most pernicious Designs carrying on against my Country, but, perhaps, constrain me to act further than Affection to *France* could lawfully permit me.

WHETHER the Ministers of *France* now have, or then had, any such Designs, is what I shall not argue about at present. The few Facts and Circumstances I have related, out of many more I could urge, I hope will be found, by every honest Man, sufficient to justify my Conduct; and I have not hitherto received any Treatment to give me Cause to repent it: I have now the conscious Satisfaction, whatever may happen to me, of being in the Right once in my Life; and be that Life long or short, it shall ever be devoted to the Service of *Great Britain*, and that of the August Prince, who reigns so gloriously over us.

NOT to tire you with too long a Letter at present, I shall reserve some other important Things for another Opportunity. In the mean Time, if any Gentlemen think themselves injur'd by what I have said here, I shall be very glad to see them point out those Injuries in some publick Paper. — As to the Ministers of *France*, I still bear them all the Respect due to their Character, and assure them, that, in whatever Place or Station Providence pleases to dispose of me, I shall serve their Country with as much Chearfulness and Ardour as heretofore, when I am as fully perswaded again of their Sincerity and *Bonne-Foi* as I was some Time ago, and see them confirmed by such a Conduct as *Great Britain* may have no Reason to be jealous of, nor any Occasion to provide against. In return, I hope they will give me Leave to tell the World, that I owe them no Money-Obligations, not even for a single Farthing, for all the Services I render'd them; tho', I must confess, they

gave



gave me as much as I asked of them: This Declaration is necessary for the Honour of us both. But had they, while I was serving them, both publickly and privately, restored back to me any Part of that Fortune which the *Visa*, that followed the *Mississippi System*, had arbitrarily plunder'd from me, they would have done an Act of Justice and Humanity to an unhappy Family, who, in all moral Probability, never could have been unfortunate, had they not taken *France* for a Retreat. I am,

S I R,

*Your most humble and obedient Servant,*

London,  
Sep. 23. 1734.

Charles Forman.

AS the Author of this Letter has been, till of late, a very loud and zealous Advocate for *France*, it is not a little surprizing, to see him, all on a Sudden, flinging up his Pretensions to a Recompence; renouncing all Hopes of ever recovering his Property out of the Hands of the *French*, and, without the least previous Conditions, either for an Establishment for his Family, or his own personal Security, throwing himself into the Power of a Minister, whom he had so highly provoked? This Step, indeed, shews him to be a Man of Resolution and Courage, and cannot but give the World a high Idea of the noble and generous Soul of Sir ROBERT WALPOLE; but I am apt to believe that Mr. *Forman* had much stronger Reasons for so intrepid a Conduct than any contained in this Letter: Perhaps, he has not yet found it convenient to publish them, but, I am persuaded, he will not let us remain long in Suspense, *but rather be so just to himself as to furnish us with those Proofs we expect of his thorough Conversion.*

I own, nevertheless, that what he has already communicated to us is sufficient to justify his Conduct; I can assure my Country of the Truth of what he says concerning the *Irish* College, for I was in *Paris* during the whole Scene; and if I have any Objection to him on this Head, it is for having been, by much, too modest in relating the insolent  
and

and inhuman Treatment the *British* Subjects meet with in *France*. What he advances as to the Design of turning the College entirely into a *Barrack* for *Recruits* for the *Irish* Regiments in the *French* Service, I have sufficient Reason to know to be strictly true, and, would it not swell this Postscript to too great a Bulk, I could give the whole History and Progress of that Design, with the particular Views of *Bourk* and *Vaubrun*, especially the latter, who expected no less than to be recommended for a *Cardinal's* Cap by the *Chevalier de St. George*, and the other to be made a Bishop for his good Service in establishing a *Nursery* for *Recruits*. Even, according as Things had been managed before, that very College alone, had furnished near *twelve hundred Recruits* for the *Irish Regiments* since the *Revolution*; but *Bourk's* Plan would have been much more expeditious, and doubled the Number in a very little Time,

BUT tho' the *French* Ministers had so little Justice, or even good Sense, as to encourage such a Plan at a Time when they were courting the Friendship of *Britain*, yet they might have had Honour enough to keep Mr. *Forman's* Remonstrance a Secret, and not halloo the whole *Click of Jacobites* at a Gentleman, who had the Interest of *France* so much at Heart, and who had done her so many essential Services on sundry Occasions. To publish the Remonstrance he had made, and then to deny him a *Pass* to withdraw from the Storm they had raised against him; to force him, thro' a Delicacy of Honour, rather to throw himself into the utmost Peril at home, than continue where he was, redounds to the eternal Renown of the *French* Court. Here is Justice, Humanity, and Gratitude in *Folio*, to serve as a Warning to such *Britons* as either still continue misled by the Prejudices of Education, or guided by Considerations much less excusable.

IN a Word, the whole Turn of this Letter shews us, in Time, how little we can rely on the *Bonne-Foi* and *Honour* of the present Ministers of *France*; and as very few *British* Subjects have met with Mr. *Forman's* Opportunities to take the Altitude of those Gentlemen's Sincerity, I believe we shall commit no Sin against Justice or Prudence, in giving Credit to his Letter, and the useful Hints it contains; at least till we see it fairly disproved.



F I N I S

